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RECENT CASES.
Negligence -Question of Law or of .Fact. -In the recent case of
Farrell v. Waterbury Horse Railway Co., 6o Conn. 239, 2 i Atlantic
Rep. 675, the question of negligence as one of law or of fact has
been thoroughly discussed and set for that great length. In the
course of the decision the Court says: "There is involved, in
the legal conception of negligence, the existence of a test or
standard of conduct, with which the given conduct is to be
compared, and by which it is to be judged. The question
whether the -given conduct comes up to the standard is fre-
quently called the question of negligence. The result of com-
paring the conduct with the standard is generally spoken of as
'negligence,' or 'the finding of negligence.' Negligence, in
this last sense, is always a conclusion or inference, and never a
'fact,' in the ordinary sense of that word. When the question of
negligence, in the above sense, can be answered by the court, it is
called a question of law, and the answer is called an inference or
conclusion of law; when it is and must be answered by a jury or
other trier, it is generally called a question of fact, and the answer
is called an inference or conclusion of fact. Where the law itself
prescribes and defines beforehand the precise specific conduct
required, under given circumstances, the standard by which such
conduct is to be judged is found in the law. When, in such a case,
the conduct has been ascertained, the law, through the court, deter-
mines whether the conduct comes up to the standard. * *
In cases involving the question of negligence, .where the general
rule of conduct is alone applicable, where the facts found are of
such a nature that the trier must, as it were, put himself in the
place of the parties, and must exercise a sound discretion, based
upon his experience, not only upon the question what did the par-
ties do or omit, under the circumstances? but upon the further
question, what would a prudent, reasonable man have done under
those circumstances ? and especially where the facts and circum-
stances are of such a nature that honest, fair-minded, capable men
might come to different conclusions upon the latter question,-
the inference or conclusion of negligence is one to be drawn by
the trier, and not by the court as matter of law. Such an infer-
ence or conclusion will, speaking generally, be treated by this
court as one of fact, which will not be reviewed where the facts
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have been properly found, unless the court can see from the
record that in drawing such inference the trier imposed some duty
upon the parties which the law did not impose, or absolved them
from some duty which the law required of them under the circum-
stances, or in some other respect violated some rule or principle
of law."
Liquidated .Dam'ges- Penalty.- Condon v. Xemper, 27 Pacific
Reporter 829. The much vexed question of liquidated damages
and penalty has recently received an exhaustive treatment at the
hands of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the above entitled case.
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract whereby
Condon agreed to build a wall or else, at his election, to remove a
certain house a short distance and put it in as good condition as it
was before, and further stipulated as follows: "It is mutually
agreed between said parties that a failure on the part of said Con-
don to perform these obligations shall entitle said Kemper to
recover from him the sum of $5oo as liquidated and ascertained dam-
ages for the breach of this contract." Condon failed either to
build the wall or move the house, but the cost of moving it and
putting it in as good condition as before would not have exceeded
$ioo. The question before the court was the following: Are the
words of the parties to govern and the $500 to be considered as
liquidated damages, or must they look further into the actual nature
of the transaction with the primal idea of compensation in view?
After an elaborate citation of cases and text-books the court held
that when the parties made the contract and stipulated for dam-
ages in case of breach, by use of the words liquidated and ascertained
damages, fixing the amount at $500, they could not have had in
contemplation actual damages, and hence the sum mentioned in the
contract must be treated as a penalty and not as liquidated dam-
ages. Said Valentine, J., in the course of the opinion, "the ten-
dency and preference of the law is to regard a stated sum as a
.penalty, instead of liquidated damages, because actual damages can
then be recovered, and the recovery be limited to such damages."
And quoting from i Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.) he says fur-
ther, "whenever the damages were evidently the subject for cal-
culation and adjustment between the parties, and a certain sum
was agreed upon and intended as compensation, and is in fact rea-
sonable in amount, it will be allowed by the court as liquidated dam-
ages." And again from the same work, "where the stipulated
sum is wholly collateral to the object of the contract, being evi-
dently inserted merely as security for performance, it will not be
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allowed as liquidated damages." And finally to close up the
whole discussion the learned judge cites Afyer v. Hart, 40 Mich.
517, holding as follows, "Just compensation for the injury sus-
tained is the principle at which the law aims, and the parties will
not be permitted by express stipulation, to set this principle
aside."
Recitals in Afunicoal Boinds-Estoi6el.-Past v. Pulashi CO., 47
Fed. Rep. 282. A county had issued bonds in payment of stock
in a railroad. The charter granting the power to issue bonds and
levy taxes for their payment further provided : "That no such
subscription shall be made, no such bonds shall be issued, and no
such taxes shall be levied unless a majority of the legal voters of
said county shall vote for the same at an election to be held under
order of the county court." No notice of the election was pre-
scribed. The bonds recited on their face compliance with the
law. But there was no evidence to show that notice had been
given in all the voting precincts. The court held that reasonable
notice was a legal incident of every election. The silence of the
charter was no excuse. Upon the question of estoppel it said: "It
may be conceded, as a doctrine now well established, that municipal
officers are bound by recitals in their bonds as to all matters
affecting the regularity of proceedings which they have passed
upon, but it would certainly be a dangerous doctrine to maintain
that they are estopped from denying their legal power or author-
ity to make the same. These officials are the financial agents of
the people, clothed with a limited power of executing or perform-
ing some trust or duty. If no power has been granted or voted
them in any contingency to do acts or execute instruments creating
or evidencing grievous indebtedness upon the city, town, or
county, will their recitals on the face of the instrument, that they
are executed in pursuance of law or sufficient authority, make
binding obligations of such instruments as without the recitals
would be utterly void ? This cannot be the law. Such a rule
affords no safety or security to the tax-payer. The plaintiff in
this case may be regarded as a bona fide or innocent holder of the
bonds or coupons, and may possibly suffer to the extent of the
money he paid for the same. And yet it is far better he should
do so than to recognize the doctrine that municipal officers with-
out authority may, by placing on the face of their bonds untrue
statements, thereby bind the people to pay them. The plaintiff
should not have relied on the recitals in the instruments, but it
was his duty to examine into the question of power on the part of
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the Pulaski county commissioners to make the bonds. He was
bound to take notice of the want of power. This is an old, a safe,
and a familiar doctrine."
MArunicial Bonds -Estopel by Recital.-Sutlif v. Lake County, 47
Fed. Rep. io6. A county had issued bonds in excess of its consti-
tutional limit of indebtedness. The enabling act under which the
bonds were issued reiterated the same limitation. But the bonds
recited that they were "issued in compliance with a majority vote
of the qualified electors of said county under and by virtue of the
above-mentioned act of the legislature, and that all the provisions
of said act had been complied with." The Court held, however,
that the county were not estopped; that there was a wide distinc-
tion between a recital that incidental regulations had been com-
plied with where the power to issue was clearly given, and a
recital that the power itself existed ; and said, "there is nothing
in the act authorizing the county commissiohers to ascertain the
amount of the indebtedness, and determine the fact whether the
bonds were or were not in excess of the constitution'al limit. If
there had been in the act such a provision as that by which the
county commissioners would be authorized to determine the
amount of the indebtedness existing at the time of issuing the
bonds, and whether the bonds were within or beyond the constitu-
tional limit, there would be something in many decisions of the
supreme court to support the position of the plaintiff ; because it
has been many times decided by the supreme court that, whenever
a matter of fact is submitted to the county authorities for their
decision and determination, such as the holding of an election, the
form in which the bonds shall be issued, and the like, and the
county authorities proceed under the act to determine the fact, the
county shall be bound by that decision and determination ; there
shall be no other inquiry concerning it. But the question in this
case lies back of that, and relates to the power of the county to
create the indebtedness. It is believed that, whenever such a
question has eome before the supreme court, it has been uniformly
held that the county authorities cannot determine for themselves
or otherwise the question of their authority in the premises.
* * * The principle is that, when power is not given
to the county to issue the bonds, no recital whatever binds the
county. There must be power to act in the first place ; when the
power exists, recitals that it is exercised in conformity to the law
are conclusive. In this instance there was no power. The power
not existing, of course the bonds issued are void."
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Carriers of Passengers - Physical Examination -Damages- Pre-
sumption of Negligence.-Several interesting questions were consid-
ered in the case of Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 9 South. Rep. 722
(Ala.). The plaintiff was injured on the defendant's railroad on
account of the derailment of the car in which she rode. Held, that
where a physical examination of the plaintiff's person is allowed,
the selection of experts to make the examination is "entirely
within the discretion of the trial judge. Neither party has any
right, by suggestion, motion, or otherwise, to control his discre-
tion in any degree. * * * And when a competent and impar-
tial commission is named, it is a matter of no consequence what-
ever that the parties, or either of them, preferred and demanded
the appointment of other persons." It is permissible to show in
evidence that, prior to the accident, the plaintiff's health was
good, that her physical organs discharged their functions natu-
rally, etc., and that, since the accident, she could not sleep without
taking medicine, could not walk any great distance, and that her
injuries would render child-bearing perilous to life. As to the
possibility of her never marrying or having children, the court
says, "these considerations can exert no influence on the question.
It is to be assumed that every physical endowment, function, and
capacity is of importance in the life of every man and woman,
and that occasion will arise for the exercise of each and all of
them; and to that extent to which any function is destroyed, or
its discharge rendered painful or perilous by the wrongful inflic-
tion of personal injury, is the party complaining entitled to dam-
ages." The law requires "strict diligence" on the part of com-
mon carriers of passengers; and where the plaintiff has shown
injury from an accident, the presumption that the carrier was
negligent arises. Punitive damages may be given if "the condi-
tion of the rails and cross-ties, and the fact of old rails being used
constantly to repair that old track, was sufficient to authorize an
inference on the part of the jury that the defendants knew of this
condition of things, and to impute to them such recklessness or
wantonness as is the equivalent of conscious wrong-doing, in con-
tinuing to run trains over a track in such dangerous condition."
Contractor's Bonds-Rights of Suretes.-Xiessig v. Allspaugh et
al., 27 Pacific Reporter 655. One of the defendants in this case,
Lundeen, was surety for his co-defendants, Allspaugh and Hall,
upon a bond executed to plaintiff to indemnify and save him
harmless against any claims or liens for material or labor used or
employed in the construction of a building, which the principals in
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the bond had contracted to erect. The bond had incorporated in
it the contract between the plaintiff and Allspaugh and Hall,
whereby the plaintiff was authorized to retain one-fourth of the
contract price until final settlement between the parties thereto.
When the building was completed the plaintiff paid the contrac-
tors the full amount of the contract price, but there was no evi-
dence of the surety's assent to such payment. At the time of
such payment there were valid unpaid liens, known to the plain-
tiff, for labor and material used in the erection of the building,
which plaintiff was obliged subsequently to pay and which of
course belonged to the contractors to remove. Plaintiff thereupon
sued the obligors and surety on the bond to the amount of the
liens paid. The Supreme Court of California held that the surety
was not liable, since the sum which the contract authorized plain-
tiff to retain, and referred to in the bond, was charged with a
trust in favor of the surety as security against the liens, and with-
out his consent it could not be paid to his principals. The whole
law on this subject is clearly expressed in a brief sentence of the
opinion quoted from law v. East India CO., 4 Ves. 829. "It can-
not be contended, upon any principle that prevails with regard
to principal and surety, that when the principal has left a
sufficient sum in the hands of the obligee, and he thinks fit,
instead of retaining it in his hands, to pay it back to the principal,
the surety can be called upon."
Master and Servant-liability for Servant's Torts-Ratdficatin.-
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the recent case of JDemp-
sey v. Chambers, 28 N. E. Rep. 279, has considered the question
of ratification under peculiar circumstances. The plaintiff ordered
coal of the defendant. A third person, McCullock, without the
knowledge of* the defendant, delivered the coal, and irf so doing
broke a pane of plate glass in the plaintiff's building. Afterwards,
with full knowledge of the accident and delivery of the coal by
McCullock, the defendant presented a bill to the plaintiff and
demanded payment. Plaintiff sued for the injury to the plate
glass and the lower court held he could recover, finding that
though McCullock was not the servant of the defendant at the
time of the accident, the defendant ratified his delivery of the coal
when he presented the bill to the plaintiff. This the Supreme
Court holds was correct: "The delivery was for the plaintiff's ben-
efit, and while the ratification was not directed specifically to the
trespass, which was not for the defendant's benefit, if taken by
itself, yet it was so connected with McCullock's employment that
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the defendant would have been liable as master if McCullock had
really been his servant when delivering the coal." The court
were unable to find anything in the books dealing with the exact
case, but were of the opinion that the general course of authority
required them to hold that the ratification established the relation
of master and servant between the defendant and McCullock from
the beginning, with all its incidents, including the liability for the
latter's negligence. The court however doubt the present wisdom
of the doctrine of the responsibility of the master for the acts of
his servant, especially as regards the doctrine of ratification, and
hints that were they drawing up a code on the subject it might
not be in accordance with the present decision.
Contract of "Sale or Return. "- Wailes v. Howison, 9 South. Rep.
594 (Ala.). W. delivered to H., for the sum of $ioo, certain min-
eral rights or options to land, upon consideration that, if H. should
pay W. $io, ooo within twenty days, the options should become
the property of H. ; and H. obligated himself to pay W. $io, ooo, or
to return the options within thirty days. W. transferred the options
by indorsement on the back. H. failed to return them within
thirty days, whereupon W. sued for the Sio, ooo. W. contended
that the contract was one of "sale or return"; that when H.
failed to return the options within thirty days, the obligation to
pay $io, ooo became absolute. But the court held that it was not
a contract of "sale or return," but that the payment of $io,ooo
was a condition precedent to a sale. The court says: "As between
the parties a sale of the mineral rights and options was not
intended until payment of the $io,ooo, for it is expressly pro-
vided that 'then' (upon the payment of $io,ooo) the mineral
rights shall become the property of Howison. The payment of
$ioo was a sufficient consideration to uphold the purchase of the
options for twenty days, and during that time Wailes could not
revoke or rescind the offer of sale. During the twenty days it
was optional with Howison either to purchase the mineral rights
by paying the $Io,ooo or decline the purchase. He had paid $ioo
for this privilege. A mere failure alone to pay within twenty
days terminated his optional, rights and Wailes then could have
compelled him to deliver up the option contract. * * *
Looking at the entire contract we are satisfied that the parties
never intended, and the contract is not, an absolute promise to
pay $io,ooo as a bargain of 'sale or return,' or as liquidated
damages for failing to return the options within thirty days."
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Obligations of Telephone Companies - alidiVy of Contracts Forbidding
its Use.- Postal Telegraph, Co. v. Telephone Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 633.
A writ of mandamus was applied for by the Telegraph Co. to
compel the Telephone Co. to furnish it with service. The Tele-
phone Co. defended, alleging a contract with the Western Union
Telegraph Co., by which it had transferred all its telephone
patents to the licensor of the Telephone Co. on condition that the
Western Union Telegraph Co. should have exclusive license to
use the telephone in receiving and transmitting telegraph mes-
sages for a term of years; and that the terms of its license for-
bade it to supply any other telegraph company than the Western
Union with telephones for telegraphic purposes. The court
declared the Telephone Co. a common carrier, and said : "Being
a common carrier, the telephone company has not the right to
discriminate in granting licenses for the use of the telephone
instruments. It has already been noticed that the Western Union
Telegraph Co. is not the owner of any of thb telephone patents,
but only a licensee. Whatever claims that company had in the
patents were transferred by it to the National Bell Telephone Co.
under the contract of November ioth, which provided that there-
after the telegraph company should have the exclusive use of the
telephone for purposes of telegraphy. But the enforcement of
this part of the contract would violate the rule that, when the use
of a patented device is thrown open to the public, or to classes of
the public, all are entitled to use it on the same terms as others in
the same class; and, therefore, any contract or agreement which
would effectually evade the rule must be declared void as being
against public policy, both at common law and by statute."
Chattel Mortgages- Priorities- Claims of Creditors.- H-libbard &"
Co. et al. v. C'ibb et al., 49 N. W. Rep. 823 (Wis.). This was an
action brought for the purpose of determining the right to certain
money on deposit as proceeds of a sale. The facts were these.
A, on behalf of a firm, afterwards insolvent, executed a chattel
mortgage to B for $3,500, B taking possession of property, and A
subsequently executing another mortgage upon same property to
C for $9,787, C taking possession of same property jointly with B.
The defendants, who are creditors of the insolvent firm, instituted
garnishee proceedings against B, the first mortgagee, and C, the
second, the result being that only $I,300 of the first mortgage
was declared valid, the other $2,200 being for an individual debt
of one of the firm, and void as against creditors, and the mortgage
of C being declared valid in toto. The property was sold, the
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proceeds being placed in custody of B, awaiting this decision; the
plaintiffs claiming the $2,2oo as against the defendants, creditors
of the firm. By a divided court it was decided that where a
chattel mortgage is held valid for a part only of a mortgage debt,
the holder of a valid second mortgage on the same property is
entitled to the benefit of the amount so deducted from first mort-
gage debt as against the mortgage creditors, the second mortgagee
taking something more than the mere equity of redemption
remaining in the mortgagor, after execution of first mortgage.
Lyon, J., says: "Both mortgages being valid, the reasonable rule
seems to be that the second mortgage takes all the interest in the
property remaining after the first mortgage is satisfied and the
subsequent attaching or garnishing creditors of the mortgagor
must be postponed till both mortgages are satisfied."
Citizenship of Corporations.-Stephens v. R. R. Co., 47 Fed. Rep.
53 o . The St. Louis and San Francisco R. R. Co. had been origi-
nally chartered by the State of Missouri. By an act of the Arkan-
sas legislature it was legalized as a corporation of Arkansas. A
citizen of Arkansas brought an action against it in the State Court
of Arkansas. The corporation undertook to remove to the Fed-
eral Court. As to its power to do so the Court say: "This Court
held, in 46 Fed. Rep. 47, that defendant, a corporation of Missouri,
had by virtue of the act of the Arkansas legislature of March 13,
x889, become also a corporation of Arkansas. But did this act
make it any less a corporation of Missouri, by which State it was
first incorporated? The fact that the defendant holds and exer-
cises chartered powers by the common legislature of two States,
and exercises a common citizenship of those States, does not
destroy its rights as a citizen of Missouri, for it does not take away
the fact of its citizenship in such State. * * * The effect
of the legislation of Arkansas making the defendant a corporation
of the State of Arkansas cannot be so construed as to take away
the right of the defendant, created by law a citizen of Missouri,
from going into the Federal Court, or hindering a citizen from
bringing a suit against it in such court, as to do so would be an
exercise of power by the legislature of the State, which, under the
Constitution of the U. S. belongs alone to Congress-that of defin-
ing the jurisdiction of the Federal Court."
Corporations- 4ction against Stockholders by Creditors.-Barnes v.
Babcock et a., 27 Pacific Reporter 674. In this very recent case
the Supreme Court of California passes upon many of the ques-
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tions previously decided in the leading case of Hatch v. Dana, ioz
U. S. 205, and in full accord therewith. In brief it decides that a
judgment creditor who has had an execution returned unsatisfied
against a street railroad company may maintain an action against
its stockholders to recover, for the benefit of all creditors who
may desire to be made parties, the amount due upon unpaid sub-
scriptions for stock. The judgment and execution against the
corporation returned unsatisfied is conclusive proof that the cred-
itor has exhausted his legal remedy against the corporation, and
no evidence is admissible to rebut the presumption. Further, said
judgment, in the absence of fraud or collusion between the corpo-
ration and the plaintiff, is conclusive against the company and its
stockholders as to the indebtedness upon which it was based, and
hence evidence that said indebtedness arose upon a contract ultra
vires is inadmissible. Stockholders' liability is several, and conse-
quently it is unnecessary to make them all defendants ; nor is evi-
dence admissible to show that the legal holder of stock on the cor-
poration's books is in fact trustee or pledgee, and not the real equi-
table owner, and as such legal holder he is alone liable for unpaid
subscriptions.
Taxation -National Bank Stock-Deduction of Indebtedness.-
Upon a re-hearing in the case of Bressler v. Wayne County, 49 N.
W. Rep. 787, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed its former
decision that the owner of national bank stock, having no other
moneyed capital, could deduct in the assessment and taxation of
such shares his bona fide debts. The court reviewed numerous
decisions involving the point in question, rendered by the U. S.
Supreme Court, among them being People v. Weaver, ioo U. S.
539, Pelham v. Bank, ior U. S. r43, and Bank v. City of N. Y.,
121 U. S. 130, the latter being cited at length, they being to
the effect that "any method of assessment of taxes which pro-
hibits the owner of national bank shares, who owns no other
credits or ' moneyed capital,' from deducting his bona fide indebt-
edness from the value of such shares, and permits the deduction
of such debts in the assessment of like property, similarly situated,
conflicts -with the act of Congress." The court says: "We reach
the conclusion that in this State in the assessment of shares of
national bank stock, the owners thereof are not entitled to deduct
their bona fide indebtedness from the value of such shares of stock."
Mortgage-Subrogation.-Saulding v. Harvey, 28 N. E. Rep.
323 (Ind.). Defendant was the holder of a mortgage against one
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Lockwood, who at the time was under guardianship, being of
unsound mind. Defendant, however, being unaware of the inca-
pacity of his mortgagor and acting in entire good faith, in order
to protect his mortgage had paid off a judgment debt which the
sheriff was proceeding to satisfy by sale of the lands. On a suit
to foreclose the mortgage it was declared void, but the Supreme
Court held that he was not a mere volunteer in regard to the
judgment which he paid, and, therefore, was entitled to be subro-
gated to the rights of the judgment creditor. They say it is not
necessary that the judgment debtor should have been insolvent,
and the mortgaged land the only property against which the judg-
ment could have been collected, to entitle one to the right of sub-
rogation; the right depends upon the circumstances attending
the payment of the debt to which the security is an incident.
The validity of the mortgage is not essential, for the right is not
founded upon contract, either express or implied, but upon prin-
ciples of equity and justice intended to afford protection to a mer-
itorious creditor, and prevent the sweeping away of the fund
from which in good conscience he ought to be paid.
Surface Waters-Obstruction of Flow.-Schnitzuis v. Bailey, 22
Atl. Rep. 732. A mandatory injunction will issue to compel an
adjoining proprietor to remove any obstruction placed on his land
to prevent water from flowing thereon, where such water, whether
coming from springs, rains or melting snows, has flowed over the
land in a well-defined channel for a period of time so long that the
memory of man runneth not to the contrary; nor does it matter
whether the channel be natural or artificial. According to the
authorities it is good policy for courts to encourage the cultivation of
the soil for agriculture and trade purposes. If the farmer can
improve his land by changing the water-course thereon which passes
from his land to and upon lands of lower proprietors, without sub-
stantial injury to such lower proprietors, he may do so. To this
extent he may increase the volume or velocity thereof by surface
or under diainage. The lower proprietors have no right to com-
plain, unless they can show material injury. The same rules
apply to additional drains, which have rendered productive, land
formerly too wet or spongy to be available.
Conflict of laws- Usury.- Staples v. Nott, 28 N. E. Rep. 515
(N. Y.). Defendant was indorser of a note made in favor of the
plaintiff pursuant to an agreement made in Washington, D. C.
According to that agreement the note was given to secure an
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umpaid balance due on an old note and was to bear interest at 7%.
Plaintiff made a draft of a note embodying that agreement and
handed it to the maker for execution, who took it back with him
to his home in New York where his and the defendant's signa-
tures were affixed as maker and indorser respectively, after which
it was mailed to plaintiff in Washington. Being sued on the note
the defendant attempted to defend on the ground of usury, 7%
being in excess of the legal rate of interest in New York ; verdict
was ordered for the plaintiff and the Court of Appeals holds there
was no error. The transactions which resulted in the agreement
to extend the time of the payment of the old debt and to accept a
new note took place wholly within the District of Columbia, and
whatever was enacted in the matter elsewhere neither added to
nor altered the agreement of the parties. The note was but the
evidence of that agreement and the fact that both signatures were
affixed in New York and that it was payable at a New York bank
cannot affect the validity of the original agreement.
Pledge- Conversion -Books of Stock Exchange in Evidence.-In
Terry v. Birningham Nat. Bank, 9 South. Rep. 299, the Supreme
Court of Alabama decided that where a pledgee of stock sells the
stock without notice to the pledgeor, himself being the purchaser,
and afterwards notifies the pledgeor that he is going to sell, there
is no conversion. "To constitute a conversion, there must be a
tortious detention of the property from the owner, or its destruc-
tion, or the exclusion or defiance of the owner's right, or withhold-
ing the possession under a claim of title inconsistent with that of
the owner. * * * The notice given of the intended sale
of the stock on the Stock Exchange was a recognition of the
right of the pledgeor." It was also decided that the books of the
stock exchange were not admissible in evidence when the absence
of the secretary, who kept the books, was not explained. "At
common law, the admissibility of the books of the corporation
depended upon the nature of the acts recorded. If they were
obviously of a public character, and the entries made by a proper
officur, they will be received in evidence for or against the corpo-
ration. Taylor Ev. § 1781. But the author does not extend the
rule to acts of a private character, where the corporation is not a
party." Morawetz on Private Corp. §§ 40, 75, 76, is cited.
Arbitration -Refusal of Arbitrators to Receive Evidence.- The
Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Hurdle v. Stallings, 13 S. E.
Rep. 720, have declared that, where two parties leave to arbitra-
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tors the settlement of the lines between their lands, and the arbi-
trators refuse to receive in evidence the plaintiff's deeds, plats,
etc., relating to the lands in controversy, the award should be set
aside. The court says: "Arbitrators have some power within
their discretion to determine how much evidence they will hear,
(Ntickalls v. Warren, 6 Q. B. 615, per Lord DENMAN, C. J.) but it
is their general duty to hear all evidence material to the case
which is offered. * * * In this case the arbitrators were
to settle the lines between the parties and all matters of differ-
ence in relation thereto. The evidence, according to the affidavits
of the plaintiff, was offered for that purpose, and there was no
attempt whatever to show that it was immaterial. * * *
We are clearly of the opinion that they [the arbitrators] have no
power to arbitrarily decline to receive or examine any testimony
whatever." "
Partnersho 
-Accounting- Compensation of Partner.- The case
of Morris v. Grifen, 49 N. W. Rep. 846 (Iowa), was a Bill in Equity
to wind up a partnership. At the time the plaintiff and defendant
entered into copartnership, the plaintiff was in the employ of 0. &
Co., and continued in such employment, which was for nine months
in each year, during all the time of the firm's existence. Upon
trial of the case to the court the decree found that defendant was
indebted to the firm for some $14,ooo, and this suit is brought
to, compel payment. The defendant sets off against such
amount a bill for services during the existence of the partnership
for the management of its business. Upon this point the court
held: that it would from the circumstance imply an agreement,
upon the absence of an express one to the same effect, between the
partners to compensate the defendant for services rendered on
behalf of the partnership, and that as the plaintiff left the manage-
ment of the firm's business to the defendant, he (the defendant)
would upon the implied agreement be permitted to offset his
indebtedness to the firm by being credited for such services.
Judgment by Confession.--Teel v. Yost, 28 N. E. Rep. 353. The
New York Court of Appeals has recently decided that an action
may be maintained in that State upon a judgment by confession
entered in the courts of another State, even though the service
and form of the judgment would not have been sufficient in a
New York court under the local statutes. Such a judgment, when
in conformity with the general practice of such other State,, is to
be given the same credit as any other judgment.
